PROCESS SAFETY: Is It in Our Culture?

PROCESS SAFETY: Is It in Our Culture?

PROCESS SAFETY: Integrating into Your Organizations Culture 77th PIChE National Convention Boracay Ecovillage Resort & Convention Center February 17 20, 2016 By: Engr. Ireneo A. Raule, Jr. PROCESS SAFETY: Integrating into Your Organizations Culture Share experience and insights in how we could create Task/Objective: a process safety mindset in your organization: DEFINITION (http://www.api.org/Environment-Health-and-Safety/Process-Safety) Process safety is part of safety management and focuses on the concerns of major hazards impacting, safety, environmental damage and business losses. The goal of process safety management is to develop plant systems and procedures to prevent unwanted releases that may ignite and cause toxic impacts, local mitigate fires or explosions. Let me add: to the effects of released hazards Introduce HEMP, RAM and Bow-Tie Diagrams Integrate safety management in key business management systems, e.g. strategic planning, objectives setting, reward and recognition Begin to plant the seed of safety culture in the organization. Shift the paradigm toward safety being viewed more as an investment than an expense. 77th PIChE National Convention

February 17 2005: Buncefield, UK Before the fire After the fire Event: 250,000 liters of gasoline overflowed; a vapor cloud formed which ignited causing a massive explosion and a fire that lasted five days. Consequence: No fatalities but 40 injured; 20 tanks destroyed; 5 companies criminally charged and found guilty; fined 4.1 million; 1 billion in losses Cause: a) Failed level control system; b) overflow undetected for 24 minutes; c) containment failure Source: http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/buncefield/buncefi eld-report.pdf 77th PIChE National Convention February 17 1976: Seveso Chemical Plant, Italy Event: Runaway reaction causing the release of gas including dioxin TCCD (its presence unknown at the time),

which is 100,000 times more toxic than cyanide. https://www.google.com.ph/search? q=1976+seveso+italy&rlz=1C1GGGE Consequence: 1,800 has. of land contaminated; 80,000 domestic animals killed; locally grown food banned for months; cases of cancer, dermatitis, neuropathy, deformed babies and abortion Cause: a) standard procedure skipped; b) runaway reaction not factored in design; c) delayed order to evacuate 77th PIChE National Convention February 17 2005: Texas BP Refinery Event: Refinery explosion and fire during startup of isomerization unit Consequence: 15 fatalities and 180 people injured; community alarmed as houses within 1,200 meters were damaged; $ 1.5 billion in losses Cause: a) raffinate splitter tower was overfilled; b) pressure relief devices opened resulting in a flammable liquid geyser from a blow down stack that was not equipped with a flare Source: http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/csbfinalreportbp.pdf

77th PIChE National Convention February 17 2001: Toulouse, France A huge crater, 65 x 45 x 7 meters deep, caused by the explosion Event: Detonation of 20-120 MT of ammonium nitrate (equivalent to 20 to 40 tons of TNT) Consequence: 31 fatalities; thousands hospitalized; air and water pollution; 172 commercial establishments impacted; $ 2 billion in losses Cause: mixing of incompatible chemicals while in storage Source: https://www.google.com.ph/search? q=2001+toulouse+france+incident&rlz= 1C1GGGE 77th PIChE National Convention February 17 1974: Flixborough, UK Event: Warlike explosion (equivalent to 15 tons of TNT) due to ignition and rapid deflagration of massive vapor cloud of escaped cyclohexane (40 tons released in 30 seconds) Consequence: 53 casualties;

hundreds injured; 1,821 houses and 167 shops destroyed Cause: a) Process change (reactor bypass) not sufficiently evaluated; b) cause of reactor damage not determined. Source: https://www.google.com.ph/search?q=1974+flixborough+disaster&rlz=1C1GGGE 77th PIChE National Convention February 17 1984: Bhopal Tragedy, India Event: 27 tons of methyl isocyanate (MIC) released into the air at 1 am when nearby residents were asleep Consequence: About 5,000 fatalities; 350,000 people suffered respiratory ailments; Plant operation shutdown; plant eventually sold (Top) Now-defunct Union Carbide plant Source: https://www.google.com.ph/ Cause: a) water entered the tank (negligence or sabotage?) and reacted with the stored MIC leading to violent exothermic reaction; b) cooling system not working search? q=1984+bhopal+gas+tragedy&rlz=1 C1GGGE

77th PIChE National Convention February 17 WITH THE RIGHT MINDSET & ATTITUDE, TEAMWORK, TRAINING, ALL ACCIDENTS CAN BE PREVENTED! Incident 2005 Buncefield 1976 Seveso 2005 Texas BP 2001 Toulouse 1974 Flixborough 1984 Bhopal Causes Possible Interventions 1. HAZOP especially during early design stage 2. Management of Change a) standard procedure skipped; b) runaway 3. Principles in MOS/OOS reaction not factored in design; c) delayed 4. Chemical Handling Safety evacuation (dioxin presence unknown then) 5. Commissioning Process a) raffinate splitter tower overfilled; b) blow Systems down stack had no flare 6. IPF Component Testing mixing of incompatible chemicals while in 7. Monitor and Control storage Conditions / Alarm

Management a) Process change (reactor bypass) not sufficiently evaluated; b) cause of reactor 8. Near Miss/Incident Reporting damage not determined 9. Operator Safety Check Training a) Violent exothermic reaction of water and a) Failed level control system; b) overflow undetected for 24 minutes; c) containment failure MIC; b) cooling system not working 77th PIChE National Convention February 17 WITH THE RIGHT MINDSET & ATTITUDE, TEAMWORK, TRAINING, ALL ACCIDENTS CAN BE PREVENTED! Incident 2005 Buncefield 1976 Seveso 2005 Texas BP 2001 Toulouse 1974 Flixborough 1984 Bhopal Causes Possible Interventions 1. HAZOP especially during early design stage 2. Management of Change

a) standard procedure skipped; b) runaway 3. Principles in MOS/OOS reaction not factored in design; c) delayed 4. Chemical Handling Safety evacuation (dioxin presence unknown then) 5. Commissioning Process a) raffinate splitter tower overfilled; b) blow Systems down stack had no flare 6. IPF Component Testing mixing of incompatible chemicals while in 7. Monitor and Control storage Conditions / Alarm Management a) Process change (reactor bypass) not sufficiently evaluated; b) cause of reactor 8. Near Miss/Incident Reporting damage not determined 9. Operator Safety Check Training a) Violent exothermic reaction of water and a) Failed level control system; b) overflow undetected for 24 minutes; c) containment failure MIC; b) cooling system not working 77th PIChE National Convention February 17 WITH THE RIGHT MINDSET & ATTITUDE, TEAMWORK, TRAINING, ALL ACCIDENTS CAN BE PREVENTED! Incident 2005 Buncefield 1976 Seveso

2005 Texas BP 2001 Toulouse 1974 Flixborough 1984 Bhopal Causes Possible Interventions 1. HAZOP especially during early design stage 2. Management of Change a) standard procedure skipped; b) runaway 3. Principles in MOS/OOS reaction not factored in design; c) delayed 4. Chemical Handling Safety evacuation (dioxin presence unknown then) 5. Commissioning Process a) raffinate splitter tower overfilled; b) blow Systems down stack had no flare 6. IPF Component Testing mixing of incompatible chemicals while in 7. Monitor and Control storage Conditions / Alarm Management a) Process change (reactor bypass) not sufficiently evaluated; b) cause of reactor 8. Near Miss/Incident Reporting damage not determined 9. Operator Safety Check Training a) Violent exothermic reaction of water and a) Failed level control system; b) overflow undetected for 24 minutes; c) containment failure

MIC; b) cooling system not working 77th PIChE National Convention February 17 WITH THE RIGHT MINDSET & ATTITUDE, TEAMWORK, TRAINING, ALL ACCIDENTS CAN BE PREVENTED! Incident 2005 Buncefield 1976 Seveso 2005 Texas BP 2001 Toulouse 1974 Flixborough 1984 Bhopal Causes Possible Interventions 1. HAZOP especially during early design stage 2. Management of Change a) standard procedure skipped; b) runaway 3. Principles in MOS/OOS reaction not factored in design; c) delayed 4. Chemical Handling Safety evacuation (dioxin presence unknown then) 5. Commissioning Process a) raffinate splitter tower overfilled; b) blow Systems down stack had no flare 6. IPF Component Testing mixing of incompatible chemicals while in 7. Monitor and Control storage

Conditions / Alarm Management a) Process change (reactor bypass) not sufficiently evaluated; b) cause of reactor 8. Near Miss/Incident Reporting damage not determined 9. Operator Safety Check Training a) Violent exothermic reaction of water and a) Failed level control system; b) overflow undetected for 24 minutes; c) containment failure MIC; b) cooling system not working 77th PIChE National Convention February 17 WITH THE RIGHT MINDSET & ATTITUDE, TEAMWORK, TRAINING, ALL ACCIDENTS CAN BE PREVENTED! Incident 2005 Buncefield 1976 Seveso 2005 Texas BP 2001 Toulouse 1974 Flixborough 1984 Bhopal Causes Possible Interventions 1. HAZOP especially during early design stage

2. Management of Change a) standard procedure skipped; b) runaway 3. Principles in MOS/OOS reaction not factored in design; c) delayed 4. Chemical Handling Safety evacuation (dioxin presence unknown then) 5. Commissioning Process a) raffinate splitter tower overfilled; b) blow Systems down stack had no flare 6. IPF Component Testing mixing of incompatible chemicals while in 7. Monitor and Control storage Conditions / Alarm Management a) Process change (reactor bypass) not sufficiently evaluated; b) cause of reactor 8. Near Miss/Incident Reporting damage not determined 9. Operator Safety Check Training a) Violent exothermic reaction of water and a) Failed level control system; b) overflow undetected for 24 minutes; c) containment failure MIC; b) cooling system not working 77th PIChE National Convention February 17 WITH THE RIGHT MINDSET & ATTITUDE, TEAMWORK, TRAINING, ALL ACCIDENTS CAN BE PREVENTED! Incident 2005 Buncefield 1976 Seveso

2005 Texas BP 2001 Toulouse 1974 Flixborough 1984 Bhopal Causes Possible Interventions 1. HAZOP especially during early design stage 2. Management of Change a) standard procedure skipped; b) runaway 3. Principles in MOS/OOS reaction not factored in design; c) delayed 4. Chemical Handling Safety evacuation (dioxin presence unknown then) 5. Commissioning Process a) raffinate splitter tower overfilled; b) blow Systems down stack had no flare 6. IPF Component Testing mixing of incompatible chemicals while in 7. Monitor and Control storage Conditions / Alarm Management a) Process change (reactor bypass) not sufficiently evaluated; b) cause of reactor 8. Near Miss/Incident Reporting damage not determined 9. Operator Safety Check Training a) Violent exothermic reaction of water and a) Failed level control system; b) overflow undetected for 24 minutes; c) containment failure

MIC; b) cooling system not working 77th PIChE National Convention February 17 WITH THE RIGHT MINDSET & ATTITUDE, TEAMWORK, TRAINING, ALL ACCIDENTS CAN BE PREVENTED! Incident 2005 Buncefield 1976 Seveso 2005 Texas BP 2001 Toulouse 1974 Flixborough 1984 Bhopal Causes Possible Interventions 1. HAZOP especially during early design stage 2. Management of Change a) standard procedure skipped; b) runaway 3. Principles in MOS/OOS reaction not factored in design; c) delayed 4. Chemical Handling Safety evacuation (dioxin presence unknown then) 5. Commissioning Process a) raffinate splitter tower overfilled; b) blow Systems down stack had no flare 6. IPF Component Testing mixing of incompatible chemicals while in 7. Monitor and Control

storage Conditions / Alarm Management a) Process change (reactor bypass) not sufficiently evaluated; b) cause of reactor 8. Near Miss/Incident Reporting damage not determined 9. Operator Safety Check Training a) Violent exothermic reaction of water and a) Failed level control system; b) overflow undetected for 24 minutes; c) containment failure MIC; b) cooling system not working 77th PIChE National Convention February 17 WITH THE RIGHT MINDSET & ATTITUDE, TEAMWORK, TRAINING, ALL ACCIDENTS CAN BE PREVENTED! Incident 2005 Buncefield 1976 Seveso 2005 Texas BP 2001 Toulouse 1974 Flixborough 1984 Bhopal Causes Possible Interventions 1. HAZOP especially during

early design stage 2. Management of Change a) standard procedure skipped; b) runaway 3. Principles in MOS/OOS reaction not factored in design; c) delayed 4. Chemical Handling Safety evacuation (dioxin presence unknown then) 5. Commissioning Process a) raffinate splitter tower overfilled; b) blow Systems down stack had no flare 6. IPF Component Testing mixing of incompatible chemicals while in 7. Monitor and Control storage Conditions / Alarm Management a) Process change (reactor bypass) not sufficiently evaluated; b) cause of reactor 8. Near Miss/Incident Reporting damage not determined 9. Operator Safety Check Training a) Violent exothermic reaction of water and a) Failed level control system; b) overflow undetected for 24 minutes; c) containment failure MIC; b) cooling system not working 77th PIChE National Convention February 17 INCIDENT INVESTIGATION MUST ALSO FIND THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF AN ACCIDENT, NOT JUST THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE 2005 BP TEXAS CITY INCIDENT INVESTIGATION

NUMBER OF UNDERLYING CAUSES: People branch 11 Fire branch 54 Total - 65 Source: http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/c sbfinalreportbp.pdf 77th PIChE National Convention February 17 INCIDENT INVESTIGATION MUST ALSO FIND THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF AN ACCIDENT, NOT JUST THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE TEXAS BP INCIDENT (Source: http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/csbfinalreportbp.pdf) Immediate Cause/s: Flammables released from blowdown stack and formed a vapor cloud Underlying Cause/s (partial) Safety culture (failure to invest; cost cutting, startup in spite of malfunction) Regulatory oversight (past inspections not comprehensive, then 301 violations) Process safety metrics (injury rate was the key metric in spite of loss history, not encouraged to report safety problems) Human Factors (poor shift turnover, fatigue, training program inadequate) BUNCEFIELD INCIDENT (Source: http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/buncefield/buncefield-report.pdf) Immediate Cause/s:

Failure of Design and Maintenance of Overflow Protection System Underlying Cause/s (partial) Deficient management systems; no effective audit system Increased pressure on staff due to higher throughput Lack of engineering support from head office Culture that focused on operating, while safety did not get attention or priority Unclear understanding of risks and the safety critical systems designed to control Leadership and top-level management involvement lacking 77th PIChE National Convention February 17 LIST OF PROCESS SAFETY INTERVENTIONS AND TOOLS --- (taken from the sample accidents) --1. HAZOP especially during early design stage 2. Management of Change 3. Principles in MOS/OOS 4. Chemical Handling Safety 5. Commissioning Process Systems 6. IPF Component Testing 7. Monitor and Control Conditions / Alarm Management 8. Near Miss Incident Reporting 9. Operator Safety Check Training 10. Incident Investigation

11. Logic Tree --- (some more) --12. Process Hazard Analysis 13. Job Hazard Analysis 14. Emergency Response 15. Crisis Handling 16. Personal Protective Equipment 17. Permit to Work Systems 18. Lock out Tag out (LOTO) 19. (and many more) HOW CAN WE SYSTEMATICALLY KNOW THE HAZARDS TO BE ADDRESSED AND THE RISKS THAT THESE POSE, AND HENCE THE APPROPRIATE INTERVENTIONS? 77th PIChE National Convention February 17 HAZARDS & EFFECTS MANAGEMENT PROCESS (HEMP): A SYSTEMATIC WAY OF IDENTIFYING, ASSESSING, CONTROLLING AND MITIGATING HAZARDS A hazard has the potential to cause harm to people; damage to assets (property, product, process, information); reputation and the environment. The Steps Approximate Translation Hazard Identification What can harm us? Hazard Assessment Is there a better way? Can we eliminate or avoid the hazard? How can the hazard be released? How serious will the consequence be? How probable is the consequence?

Hazard Control What are the required controls? Are the current controls adequate? effective? Hazard Mitigation or Recovery What are the required recovery? Are the current recovery adequate? effective? 77th PIChE National Convention February 17 HAZARDS & EFFECTS MANAGEMENT PROCESS (HEMP): A SYSTEMATIC WAY OF IDENTIFYING, ASSESSING, CONTROLLING AND MITIGATING HAZARDS A hazard has the potential to cause harm to people; damage to assets (property, product, process, information); reputation and the environment. The Steps Approximate Translation Hazard Identification What can harm us? Hazard Assessment Is there a better way? Can we eliminate or avoid the hazard? How can the hazard be released? How serious will the consequence be? How probable is the consequence?

Hazard Control What are the required controls? Are the current controls adequate? effective? Hazard Mitigation or Recovery What are the required recovery? Are the current recovery adequate? effective? 77th PIChE National Convention February 17 HAZARDS CAN BE INDENTIFIED IN A NUMBER OF WAYS Some of the common ways 1. Accident Records / Benchmarking 2. Hazard Data Base 3. Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) 4. Process Hazard Analysis 5. Job Hazard Analysis 6. Safety Procedures 7. Use Technical Standards 8. Use Material Safety Data Sheets 9. Others 77th PIChE National Convention February 17 HAZARDS CAN BE INDENTIFIED IN A NUMBER OF WAYS Some of the common ways 1. Accident Records / Benchmarking 2. Hazard Data Base

3. Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) 4. Process Hazard Analysis 5. Job Hazard Analysis 6. Safety Procedures 7. Use Technical Standards 8. Use Material Safety Data Sheets 9. Others 77th PIChE National Convention February 17 EXAMPLE OF A HAZARD DATA BASE OR DATA REGISTER 77th PIChE National Convention February 17 HAZARDS CAN BE INDENTIFIED IN A NUMBER OF WAYS Some of the common ways 1. Accident Records / Benchmarking 2. Hazard Data Base 3. Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) 4. Process Hazard Analysis 5. Job Hazard Analysis 6. Safety Procedures 7. Use Technical Standards 8. Use Material Safety Data Sheets 9. Others 77th PIChE National Convention February 17 HAZARD AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY Examination of a process or operation to identify and evaluate problems that may represent risks or prevent efficient operation

WHEN TO USE HAZOP: At the initial concept stage when design drawings are available When the final piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&ID) are available During construction and installation to ensure that recommendations are implemented During commissioning During operation to ensure that plant emergency and operating procedures are regularly reviewed and updated as required HAZOP RESULTS TO: Improvement of system or operations Reduced risk and better contingency More efficient operations Improvement of procedures Logical order Completeness General awareness among involved parties Team building 77th PIChE National Convention February 17 HAZARDS & EFFECTS MANAGEMENT PROCESS (HEMP):

A SYSTEMATIC WAY OF IDENTIFYING, ASSESSING, CONTROLLING AND MITIGATING HAZRDS A hazard has the potential to cause harm to people; damage to assets (property, product, process, information); reputation and the environment. The Steps Approximate Translation Hazard Identification What can harm us? Hazard Assessment Is there a better way? Can we eliminate or avoid the hazard? How can the hazard be released? How serious will the consequence be? How probable is the consequence? Hazard Control What are the required controls? Are the current controls adequate? effective? Hazard Mitigation or Recovery What are the required recovery? Are the current recovery adequate? effective? 77th PIChE National Convention February 17 RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX (RAM):

A tool that standardizes qualitative risk assessment and facilitates the categorization of risk from threats to people, assets, environment and reputation 77th PIChE National Convention February 17 RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX (RAM): A tool that standardizes qualitative risk assessment and facilitates the categorization of risk from threats to people, assets, environment and reputation CONSEQUENCES those of credible scenarios that can develop from the release of the hazard. The potential consequences, rather than the actual ones, are used. A scale of consequences from 0 to 5 indicates increasing severity. Example: reaction overpressure. - Actual outcome: shutdown; high level alarm set off LIKELIHOOD estimated on the basis of historical evidence or experience that - Potential consequence: such consequence has materialized within the industry, company or smaller serious pollution, even

unit. This should not be confused with the likelihood that the hazard is released fatality it is the likelihood of the potential consequences occurring 77th PIChE National Convention February 17 RAM APPLICATION EXAMPLE IN SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT You are developing a safety management system for your petroleum plant You are to evaluate the risks when receiving gasoline in the storage tank farm A release (but not fire or explosion) has occurred once in your plant; it is an occurrence in the industry Identified risk categories: 5C (P) 4B(A) 3C (E) E A R P 77th PIChE National Convention 4C (R) The overall risk for a hazard is classified according to

which consequence has the highest rating; in this case, its a HIGH RISK. February 17 HAZARDS & EFFECTS MANAGEMENT PROCESS (HEMP): A SYSTEMATIC WAY OF IDENTIFYING, ASSESSING, CONTROLLING AND MITIGATING HAZARDS A hazard has the potential to cause harm to people; damage to assets (property, product, process, information); reputation and the environment. The Steps Approximate Translation Hazard Identification What can harm us? Hazard Assessment Is there a better way? Can we eliminate or avoid the hazard? How can the hazard be released? How serious will the consequence be? How probable is the consequence? Hazard Control What are the required controls? Are the current controls adequate? effective? Hazard Mitigation or Recovery What are the required recovery? Are the current recovery adequate?

effective? 77th PIChE National Convention February 17 RISKS SHOULD BE REDUCED TO TOLERABLE LEVEL AND ALARP If risks are intolerable with respect to policy and strategic objectives, alternative ways to carry out the operation should be evaluated ALARP (as low as reasonably practicable) the level (objectively assessed) at which the time, trouble, difficulty and cost of further reduction measures become unreasonably disproportionate to the additional risk reduction obtained. H A Z A R D Threat 1 Mitigates or reduces the impact of the release of the hazard Prevents the threat from successfully releasing the hazard Consequence 1 Threat 2 Threat 3 Threat 4

Controls Top Event Recovery Measures Threat 5 X Consequence 2 Consequence 3 Consequence n Threat n The Bow Tie Diagram 77th PIChE National Convention February 17 C O N S E Q U E N C E S RISKS SHOULD BE REDUCED TO A TOLERABLE LEVEL AND ALARP RISK

LEVEL REQUIREDTHREAT AND RECOVERY MEASURES HIGH Requires a minimum of three (3) effective threat controls in place for each threat. Requires a minimum of three (3) effective recovery measures for each identified consequence; one (1) recovery measure must be to automatically detect occurrence of the top event. MEDIUM Requires a minimum of two (2) effective threat controls in place for each threat. Requires a minimum of two (2) effective recovery measures for each identified consequence; one (1) recovery measure must be to automatically detect occurrence of the top event. LOW Requires procedure be in place to control each threat. Requires a minimum of one (1) effective recovery measure for IN ALL each CASES, BRING DOWN THE RESIDUAL RISK LEVEL TO ALARP. identified consequence. 77th PIChE National Convention February 17 RAM APPLICATION EXAMPLE IN SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT You are developing a safety management system for your petroleum plant You are to evaluate the risks when receiving gasoline in the storage tank farm A release (but not fire or explosion) has occurred once in your plant; it

Identified risk categories: 5C (P), 4B (A), 3C (E), 4C (R) is an occurrence in the industry The overall risk for a hazard is classified according to which consequence has the highest rating; in this case, its a HIGH RISK. RISK LEVEL REQUIREDTHREAT AND RECOVERY MEASURES HIGH Requires a minimum of three (3) effective threat controls in place for each threat. Requires a minimum of three (3) effective recovery measures for each identified consequence; one (1) recovery measure must be to automatically detect occurrence of the top event. 77th PIChE National Convention February 17 RISKS SHOULD BE REDUCED TO A TOLERABLE LEVEL AND ALARP THE BOW TIE WORKSHEET (using example of receiving gasoline in a storage tank) HAZARD THREAT CONTROL TOP EVENT RECOVERY MEASURE CONSEQUENCE

SPILL INSIDE THE BUND WALL 77th PIChE National Convention TANK OVERFLOW OR LOSS OF CONTAINMENT GASOLINE VAPOR CLOUD FORMATION FIRE February 17 RISKS SHOULD BE REDUCED TO A TOLERABLE LEVEL AND ALARP THE BOW TIE WORKSHEET (using example of receiving gasoline in a storage tank) HAZARD THREAT CONTROL TOP EVENT LEVEL IS NOT MONITORED GASOLINE WRONG VALVE LINE-UP 77th PIChE National Convention CONSEQUENCE

SPILL INSIDE THE BUND WALL TANK OVERFLOW OR LOSS OF CONTAINMENT THROUGH-WALL CORROSION RECOVERY MEASURE VAPOR CLOUD FORMATION FIRE February 17 RISKS SHOULD BE REDUCED TO A TOLERABLE LEVEL AND ALARP THE BOW TIE WORKSHEET (using example of receiving gasoline in a storage tank) HAZARD THREAT LEVEL IS NOT MONITORED CONTROL PERSONNEL IS ASSIGNED INSPECTION PROGRAM CATHODIC PROTECTION GASOLINE VOLUME LEVEL ACCOUNTING WRONG VALVE LINE-UP

USE CHECKLIST HOLD/INSPECTION CHECK RECOVERY MEASURE CONSEQUENCE SPILL INSIDE THE BUND WALL TANK OVERFLOW OR LOSS OF CONTAINMENT VISUAL MONITOR AND CONTROL HIGH LEVEL ALARM THROUGH-WALL CORROSION TOP EVENT VAPOR CLOUD FORMATION FIRE COMPUTER CONTROL SYSTEMS 77th PIChE National Convention February 17 RISKS SHOULD BE REDUCED TO A TOLERABLE LEVEL AND ALARP THE BOW TIE WORKSHEET (using example of receiving gasoline in a storage tank) HAZARD THREAT

LEVEL IS NOT MONITORED CONTROL VISUAL MONITOR AND CONTROL CORRECT CONTAINMENT SIZE INSPECTION PROGRAM CATHODIC PROTECTION VOLUME LEVEL ACCOUNTING USE CHECKLIST HOLD/INSPECTION CHECK COMPUTER CONTROL SYSTEMS 77th PIChE National Convention TANK OVERFLOW OR LOSS OF CONTAINMENT AUTO GAS DETECTION GASOLINE WRONG VALVE LINE-UP RECOVERY MEASURE PERSONNEL IS ASSIGNED HIGH LEVEL ALARM THROUGH-WALL CORROSION

TOP EVENT CONSEQUENCE SPILL INSIDE THE BUND WALL AQUEOUS FILM FORMING FOAM (AFFF) BLANKET AUTO GAS DETECTION ISOLATE IGNITION SOURCES VAPOR CLOUD FORMATION AQUEOUS FILM FORMING FOAM (AFFF) BLANKET AUTO GAS AND FIRE DETECTION AND ALARM FIRE AQUEOUS FILM FORMING FOAM (AFFF) BLANKET FIRE FIGHTING RESPONSE & RESCUE OPERATION February 17 RISKS SHOULD BE REDUCED TO A TOLERABLE LEVEL AND ALARP THE BOW TIE WORKSHEET (using example of receiving gasoline in a storage tank) HAZARD THREAT LEVEL IS NOT MONITORED

CONTROL VISUAL MONITOR AND CONTROL CORRECT CONTAINMENT SIZE INSPECTION PROGRAM CATHODIC PROTECTION VOLUME LEVEL ACCOUNTING USE CHECKLIST HOLD/INSPECTION CHECK COMPUTER CONTROL SYSTEMS 77th PIChE National Convention TANK OVERFLOW OR LOSS OF CONTAINMENT AUTO GAS DETECTION GASOLINE WRONG VALVE LINE-UP RECOVERY MEASURE PERSONNEL IS ASSIGNED HIGH LEVEL ALARM THROUGH-WALL CORROSION TOP EVENT CONSEQUENCE

SPILL INSIDE THE BUND WALL AQUEOUS FILM FORMING FOAM (AFFF) BLANKET AUTO GAS DETECTION ISOLATE IGNITION SOURCES VAPOR CLOUD FORMATION AQUEOUS FILM FORMING FOAM (AFFF) BLANKET AUTO GAS AND FIRE DETECTION AND ALARM FIRE AQUEOUS FILM FORMING FOAM (AFFF) BLANKET FIRE FIGHTING RESPONSE & RESCUE OPERATION February 17 LEARNING CHECKPOINT: What we have learned so far All safety accidents can be prevented, or risks minimized Use HEMP to systematically identify, assess, control and mitigate HAZARDS RAM HAZOP, JHA, Accident

records, MSDS, etc. IDENTIFY ASSESS HEMP HEMP CONTROL RECOVER C O N S H A Z A R D X Threat 1 Threat 2 Consequence 1 Q Threat 3Controls Threat 4 E

Top Event Recovery Measures Consequence 2 Consequence 3 Consequence The Bow Tie Diagram n U E N C E S 77th PIChE National Convention February 17 IMPLEMENT HEMP UNDER AN HSE OR QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Leadership

Commitment Linkage to policy and strategic goals Continuous improvement Systematic and periodic review Audit IDENTIFY ASSESS HEMP HEMP CONTROL RECOVER Leadership and Commitment Policy and Strategic Objectives Organisation, Responsibilities Resources, Standards & Doc. Hazard and Effects Management Planning & Procedures Implementation Corrective Action Monitoring Audit Corrective Action & Improvement Management Review

Corrective Action & Improvement INTEGRATE HSE CRITICAL ACTIVITIES INTO THE REWARD & RECOGNITION PROCESS HSE critical activities should be among the performance objectives of accountable personnel; Ensures that the activity owner is properly motivated Establish KPIs to track whether the critical activities are performed to the required standards. Whatever gets measured/rewarded gets done H A Z A R D Threat 1 Accountable Staff to operate, maintain, develop, or improve HSE critical activities Accountable Staff to operate, maintain, develop, or improve Consequence 1 Threat 2 Threat 3 Threat 4 Controls

Top Event Recovery Measures Threat 5 X Consequence 2 Consequence 3 Consequence n Threat n The Bow Tie Diagram 77th PIChE National Convention February 17 C O N S E Q U E N C E S SUMMARY

All safety accidents can be prevented, or risks minimized Use HEMP to systematically identify, assess, control and mitigate HAZARDS Implement HEMP under an HSE or quality management system Integrate HSE critical activities into the reward and recognition process Remember: Safety is everyones responsibility We, in the line and on the process floor are best equipped to identify hazards. It is our duty to make management know and understand the potential consequences of these hazards. Begin to plant the seed of safety culture in the organization. Shift the paradigm toward safety being viewed more as an investment than an expense. 77th PIChE National Convention February 17 THANK YOU 77th PIChE National Convention February 17

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